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First published Wed Feb 15, 2017
The intellectual biography of Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim
(1486–1535) provides us with significant proof of a cultural crisis in the
Renaissance. The most striking aspect of his heritage is the seemingly
paradoxical coexistence of a comprehensive treatise on magic and occult
arts, De occulta philosophia libri tres (Three Books on Occult
Philosophy), written in 1510, but then reworked, substantially enlarged,
and finally published in 1533, and a rigorous refutation of all products of
human reason, De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium atque
excellentia verbi Dei declamatio invectiva (On the Uncertainty and Vanity
of the Arts and Sciences: An Invective Declamation), printed in 1530.
Esoteric literature and inquisitorial handbooks invariably quoted Agrippa,
the celebrated (or execrated) Archimagus; bibliographies on skepticism
granted him a long lasting, but not entirely deserved, reputation as one
“who professed to overturn all the science” (Naudé 1644: 44–45).
Actually, both works, as well as all of Agrippa’s other writings, are clearly
defined moments in a broader philosophical, religious, and moral
meditation on the social significance of learning in his own time. The
“paradox” with which Agrippa challenges his readers lies precisely in the
simultaneous presence of two speculative concerns, which are scattered in
different texts, but which express, in spite of their apparent inconsistency,
a complex cultural and religious project. De vanitate performs the
epistemological function of the pars destruens, identifying the causes and
the historical responsibilities for the general spiritual wreckage of
Christian society, and introducing the proposal contained in the pars
construens. De occulta philosophia, recovering “true magic” in the
framework of Neoplatonic metaphysics and Hermetic theology, offers
1
humankind a wonder-working knowledge, one which is able to restore
human cognitive and practical capacities.
In order to understand the internal coherence of Agrippa’s intellectual
journey, his entire oeuvre has to be taken into account. The task is made
more difficult because of his specific writing strategy, which entailed
hiding his true purposes beneath a mound of borrowed material and erratic
juxtapositions. This style of thought and exposition requires Agrippa’s
readers to piece together his “scattered meaning” (dispersa intentio) and to
search for the theoretical message which is knowingly concealed within an
unsystematic exposition. The literary technique of spreading knowledge in
disguise, typical of the sapiential tradition, turned out to be increasingly
important for most Renaissance intellectuals, who were “forced to create
spaces for themselves by merging learning with prophecy” (Celenza 2001:
128). In addition, Agrippa composed his texts by gathering a wide range
of concepts and quotations from ancient and contemporary sources, which
were removed from their original context and re-composed in a new
explanatory structure. Such a way of de-constructing and re-constructing
his cultural models should be considered in the light of Agrippa’s
ideological program. By “re-writing” his sources, he uncovered
presuppositions and implications, which the sources themselves often left
unsaid, and he connected together, in a single coherent design, arguments
and points of view which remained separate in contemporary discussions.
In this way, he added a “political” meaning to the new text which was not
present in the purely cultural or religious critique put forward by his
sources. This emphasis on the civic function of philosophy can be
regarded as the most characteristic and “original” element in Agrippa’s
works.
1. Biography
2. De occulta philosophia (early draft)
3. De triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum
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4. De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum








Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa was born on 14 September 1486 in Cologne.
He matriculated at the University of Cologne in 1499 and graduated in
1502. The degree in medicine which he claimed to have earned was ruled
out by Prost (1882: 67–74), who also raised serious doubts about his
doctorates in Canon and Civil Law (in utroque iure). Nauert (1965: 10–
11), however, suggested that they might have been obtained during the two
periods of his life about which we have very little information: 1502–1507
and 1511–1518. Agrippa came into contact with the school of Albertus
Magnus at Cologne, where it was still a living tradition and where he
pursed his interest in natural philosophy, encountering the Historia
naturalis (Natural History) of Pliny the Elder for the first time. Andreas
Canter, the city poet of Cologne, probably introduced him to Lullism—
later, Agrippa wrote a long commentary, printed at Cologne in 1531, on
Lull’s Ars magna (Great Art). During his youthful studies, Agrippa also
established personal relationships with those German humanists who
shared his interest in ancient wisdom. He spent a short period in Paris,
where he might have been a student. With some French friends, he formed
a sodalitium, a sort of secret circle or initiatory brotherhood, which,
according the collection of letters from and to Agrippa, included Charles
de Bovelles (c. 1479–1533), Symphorien Champier (c. 1471–1539),
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Germain de Brie (c. 1489–1538), Germain de Ganay (d. 1520), the
portraitist at the French court Jean Perréal (c. 1455–1530), and an
unknown Italian friend, Landulfus. Between 1508 and 1509, Agrippa
undertook a mysterious journey to Spain, seemingly engaged in a military
mission. In 1509 he was charged with a course of lectures on Johannes
Reuchlin’s De verbo mirifico (On the Wonder-Working Word) at the
University of Dôle in Burgundy. This academic appointment had been
supported by the chancellor of the university, Archbishop Antoine de
Vergy. In the inaugural lecture, Agrippa pronounced a prolusion in honor
of the daughter of Emperor Maximilian, Margaret of Austria, Princess of
Austria and Burgundy. He planned to develop the speech into a more
comprehensive treatise in praise of womankind, dedicating it to Margaret.
Therefore, he began to draft, but perhaps did not finish, his celebrated De
nobilitate et praecellentia foeminei sexus declamatio (Declamation on the
Nobility and Pre-Eminence of the Female Sex), which was published only
in 1529. Agrippa’s teaching on Christian kabbalah attracted considerable
interest among the members of the university and of the local Parlement,
and he joined the collegium of theologians. Unfortunately, not everyone
had a benevolent attitude to what sounded like an attempt to spread the
“most criminal, condemned and prohibited art of kabbalah” (Expostulatio,
p. 494) in Christian schools. The Franciscan Jean Catilinet, the provincial
superior for Burgundy, preaching in the presence of Margaret at the court
of Low Countries in Ghent, denounced Agrippa as a “judaizing heretic”
(ibidem). This charge put an end to Agrippa’s teaching career in Dôle and
dashed his hopes of obtaining Margaret’s favor. Returning to Germany, in
the winter of 1509–1510 Agrippa went to the monastery of St. Jacob at
Würzburg to meet Johannes Trithemius, Abbot of Sponheim. Over the
course of a few intense days, the famous abbot and his young visitor
discussed a topic of mutual interest: natural magic and its role in
contemporary culture. The meeting had a crucial impact on Agrippa. He
quickly finished a compendium on magic, which he had been working on
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for some time. The first draft of De occulta philosophia was dedicated to
Trithemius, who received the manuscript shortly before 8 April 1510 and
generously praised Agrippa’s commitment. The book circulated in
manuscript, as evidence from Agrippa’s correspondence shows; but he
continued to assemble materials in order to revise this first draft. This aim
was achieved only twenty years later.
In London, where he had gone in 1510 to carry out a political and “very
secret assignment” (occultissimum negotium, Defensio, F. B6), probably
on the orders of Emperor Maximilian, he became familiar with John Colet,
who introduced him to the study of St. Paul’s epistles. Agrippa wrote
Commentariola (Little Commentaries) on the Epistle to the Romans,
which he then lost in Italy and recovered only in 1523, but which remain
totally unknown to us. During his stay in London, Agrippa replied to
Catilinet’s accusations with a polemical Expostulatio super Expositione
sua in librum De verbo mirifico cum Joanne Catilineti (Expostulation with
Jean Catilinet over His Exposition of the Book On the Wonder-Working
Word)—just the first in a series of countless epic battles between him and
contemporary scholastic theologians. From 1511 to 1518, Agrippa was in
Italy, serving Maximilian, but his military duties did not prevent him from
pursuing his philosophical interests. He lectured on Plato’s Symposium
(Convivium) and on the Hermetic Pimander (that is, the Corpus
Hermeticum) at the University of Pavia, in 1512 and 1515 respectively. He
probably believed that he might be able to achieve his academic ambitions
there, but his fervent expectations were soon disappointed. After the defeat
of the Swiss and Imperial troops at Marignano (13–14 September 1515),
he was forced to quit teaching and to abandon Pavia. He then sought
patronage at the court of William IX Paleologus, Marquis of Monferrato,
to whom he promptly dedicated two little works, De homine (On
Humankind) and De triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum (On the Threefold
Way of Knowing God), gathering together some notes and materials he had
already organized or perhaps even prepared for press, in Pavia. Both
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works attest to the importance of Agrippa’s contact with early sixteenth-
century Italian culture. During his stay in Italy, he joined a network of
friends and correspondents, who allowed him to deepen his knowledge of
Neoplatonic and Hermetic literature, to sharpen his acquaintance with
kabbalistic texts, and to broaden and update his bibliographical
information. For a time he was in Turin, where he lectured on theological
topics.
In the following years, Agrippa was in Metz (1518–1520), as the city
orator and advocate (advocatus), in Geneva (1521–1523), where he
practiced medicine, and, finally in Freiburg (until 1524), as the city
physician. Throughout this period, he came into contact with a number of
humanists who were engaging with the new religious ideas circulating at
the time. Therefore, his reputation as an “occult philosopher” assumed
more complex aspects. His De originali peccato declamatio (Declamation
on Original Sin), written in 1518 but not printed until 1529, puzzled the
dedicatee, Dietrich Wichwael, Bishop of Cyrene, and Agrippa’s friend
Claude Dieudonné with regard to his interpretation of Adam’s sin as
consisting in the sexual act. In Metz, he was involved in the debate on St.
Anne’s triple marriage, expressing his passionate support for Jacques
Lefèvre d’Étaples’ criticism of the popular legend that attributed three
husbands and three daughters to her. In De Beatissimae Annae monogamia
ac unico puerperio (On St. Anne’s Monogamy and Sole Childbirth, printed
in Cologne, 1534), he gave a fierce reply to the accusations of heresy
leveled at Lefèvre (and at himself) by three conservative monks. The
defense was vehement and strongly sarcastic: no wonder Lefèvre
d’Étaples reacted anxiously to Agrippa’s promise to become his ally.
Meanwhile, Agrippa had successfully defended a woman of Woippy who
was accused of being a witch, saving her from the stake. Thanks to these
courageous positions and his intense relationships with pre-Reform
circles, Agrippa was gradually assuming a by no means secondary role in
the general movement against the scholastic tradition. He won the esteem
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of many scholars (some of them would later on join the Reformation), but,
at the same time, attracted the particular attention of the religious
authorities.
In spring of 1524 Agrippa moved to Lyon to take up the office of
physician to the French king’s mother, Louise of Savoy. He tried to win
the favor of the king’s sister, Marguerite d’Alençon, by dedicating to her
his declamation De sacramento matrimonii (On the Sacrament of
Marriage, 1526) in parallel Latin and French versions. Unfortunately, it
was a blunder and a terrible failure. The princess (who had recently been
widowed) was already hostile to the Erasmian ‘spirit’, which Agrippa
referred to in order to claim the lawfulness and benefit of second
marriages. Furthermore, ecclesiastical authorities were able to recognize
the influence of some Erasmus’ condemned works on Agrippa’s positive
attitude towards marriage, as well as the link which connected it to the
treatise De sacro coniugio (On Holy Wedlock) of the Franciscan François
Lambert, who had fled to Strasbourg after joining the Reformation.
Agrippa’s position at court was becoming worse. His friendships, his
sympathies for the work of humanist Reformers, his more and more
aggressive theses—in 1526 he reworked an earlier oration or letter,
Dehortatio gentilis theologiae (Dissuasion from Pagan Theology), in
which he criticized contemporaries for their excessive curiosity about
Hermetic theology and their disregard for Christian education—were
raising doubts his religious orthodoxy. His correspondence with the Duke
of Bourbon, who had betrayed the French Crown in order to side with the
Emperor, called into question his political loyalties, and he was suspected
of involvement in a plot. His refusal to furnish an astrological
prognostication for François I and his incautious remarks about Louise’s
superstition, which a friend passed on to her, sparked off her open
hostility. Agrippa was stripped of his pension and forbidden to leave
France. In the midst of such dramatic misadventures, he wrote his De
incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum. It was a biting commentary on all
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human sciences and arts and a fierce attack on the moral and social
assumptions of his day. Agrippa subjected the work to later revisions and
enlargements, right up to the moment of publication, in 1530.
When, at last, he was allowed to leave France, Agrippa accepted the office
of archivist and imperial historiographer at the court of Margaret of
Austria, governor of the Low Countries, in Antwerp. He finally dedicated
himself to publishing his writings. In 1529 a collection of his short
treatises was printed in Antwerp by Michael Hillenius, and in 1530
another Antwerp printer, Johannes Graphaeus, brought out De vanitate. In
1531, Graphaeus also printed the enlarged version of Book I of De occulta
philosophia, dedicated to Hermann von Wied, Archbishop Elector of
Cologne (1477–1552), and the table of contents for Book II and III. Both
De vanitate and De occulta philosophia circulated widely, thanks to
further editions (in Antwerp, Cologne, and Paris), and once more Agrippa
found himself in trouble with the religious authorities. The Louvain
theologians, questioned by Margaret of Austria herself, condemned De
vanitate as scandalous, impious and heretical, and so did the Sorbonne
with respect to the Paris edition. The Parlement at Mechelin was informed
of the Louvain professors’ judgment, and required Agrippa to answer their
accusations. He replied with two fearless writings, refuting, point by point,
the criticisms in his Apologia (Defense) and accusing, in turn, his
opponents of ignorance and bad faith in his Querela (Complaint). These
events obviously put an end to Agrippa’s career at Margaret’s court, and
he was once again seeking a new protector. Hermann von Wied, who was
both interested in occult sciences and sympathized with moderate religious
reform, offered him protection and, in June 1532, brought him into his
own household. Eventually, Agrippa was able to deliver the complete,
final version of De occulta philosophia to the Cologne printer Johannes
Soter, who in November was already typesetting it. Shortly before
Christmas, however, the Dominican inquisitor Conrad Köllin denounced
the book as heretical and blasphemous, getting the city’s Senate to suspend
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the printing. Agrippa’s impassioned and controversial appeal to the
Cologne Senate (Zika 2003: 99–124) did not succeed in resolving the
impasse. It was, instead, the forceful intervention of Hermann which
enabled De occulta philosophia to appear, even though accompanied by an
appendix including the chapters of De vanitate which criticized magic.
We are not informed about the last years of Agrippa’s life, because his
correspondence stops in July 1533. He was perhaps the author of a self-
defense, Dialogus de vanitate scientiarum et ruina Christianae religionis
(Dialogue on the Vanity of the Sciences and the Ruin of Christian
Religion), fictitiously attributed to Godoschalcus Moncordius, an
otherwise unknown Cistercian monk, and printed, in all probability, by
Johannes Soter in 1534 (Zambelli 1965: 220–23). On 22 February 1534,
from Bonn, Agrippa addressed a legal memorandum to the Parliament of
the Low Countries (Zambelli 1965: 305–12). According to his pupil
Johannes Wier (1515–1565), Agrippa was in Bonn until 1535. He then
returned to France, where he was arrested on the order of François I.
Shortly after his release, he died in Grenoble in 1535 or, at the latest, in
1536.
2. De occulta philosophia (early draft)
Dedicating to Trithemius his first attempt as a reformer of magic, Agrippa
claimed to share the common desire for the renewal of a “sublime and
sacred science”, perverted by having been detached from its theoretical
context and by being practiced with anti-natural means and intentions.
Corrupted texts and inadequate critical and philosophical awareness had
made magic a convoluted jumble of errors and obscurities, despised by the
learned, mistrusted by the Church, and used with feckless irresponsibility
by superstitious old witches. Instead, in its original and pure form, magic
was a sacred body of knowledge, providing the possibility of human
dominion over all of created nature (elemental, celestial, and intellectual).
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Basically, the first draft of De occulta philosophia was structured as a
survey, which owed much to Marsilio Ficino’s De vita (On Life), Giovanni
Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio (de dignitate hominis, Oration [on the
Dignity of Humankind]), and Johannes Reuchlin’s De verbo mirifico.
These authors had already endeavored to restore magic, distinguishing
(from different perspectives and with different aims) between true and
false magic, between philosophy and pseudo-philosophy, between the
sacred and the sacrilegious. Agrippa’s program followed a slightly
different path. For Giovanni Pico, magic was “the most perfect
accomplishment of natural philosophy” (Oration, p. 226). Instead, for
Agrippa, it was “the most perfect accomplishment of the noblest
philosophy” (totius nobilissimae philosophiae absoluta consummatio, I, 2,
p. 86). This definition had significant implications. Unlike his
predecessors, Agrippa conceived of magic as a comprehensive knowledge,
gathering together all the cognitive data collected in the various fields of
human learning, and making explicit their potentials for acting on reality.
Therefore, according to the three different levels of being, there were three
different operative areas to which magic applied, making it possible to
distinguish three ‘forms’ of magic: natural magic, astrological (and
numerological) magic, and ‘religious’ or ‘ceremonial’ magic, that is, the
kabbalistic and theurgic magic. All three forms are true and good, if
properly practiced in the context of the reformed magic. This assessment
highlighted that Agrippa had moved away from another of his sources. In
De verbo mirifico, Johannes Reuchlin had proposed a similar tripartite
division in the “wonder-working art” (ars miraculorum), but he had also
recognized the intrinsic risks of each “form”. Magic based on physics
(natural magic) cannot be checked and is therefore limited in its powers.
Magic based on astrology is often false and confused. As far as ceremonial
magic is concerned, goetia, which relies on malign demons, is clearly
superstitious; theurgy, which attempts to establish contact with benign
demons, is practicable in theory, but complicated and dangerous in
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practice. Therefore, Reuchlin favored a more reliable and efficacious
alternative, a fourth way, called the “art of soliloquy” (ars soliloquia),
based on the use of the holy name of Christ. While sharing Reuchlin’s
enthusiasm for this thaumaturgic philosophy, Agrippa’s view was broader,
also embracing Ficino’s astrological magic, Pico’s natural magic, and
Neoplatonic and Hermetic theurgic magic. The all-inclusiveness of his
“restored” magic also allowed him to recover the legacy of the medieval
tradition (of Albertus Magnus, above all) and even to pay some attention
to popular beliefs—justifying them within a Neoplatonic conceptual
framework.
In Book I Agrippa explores the elemental world, reviewing the manifest
and occult virtues of stones, plants, animals, and human individuals.
Occult virtues, on which natural magic mainly focuses, are explained by
the relationship of causal correspondence, connecting the eternal
exemplars, the ideas, to the sublunary forms through the stars. In his
Neoplatonic animated cosmos, all things are harmoniously related to each
other. Magical activity consists chiefly in attracting the “spirit of the
world” (spiritus mundi). It is diffused everywhere and distributes life to
everything, acting as the mediator between heavenly souls and earthly
bodies, and allowing a sympathetic exchange between the different levels
of the ontological hierarchy.
Book II, dedicated to astrology, opens with the celebrated image of the
magus as the go-between who subjects sublunary world to the stars. The
knowledge of the laws, governing how the celestial influences flow down
to the earth, enables the magus to collaborate actively with nature,
modifying the phenomenal processes. To describe astrological images,
attracting astral virtues, Agrippa pillaged the technical details described by
Ficino in De vita coelitus comparanda (On Obtaining Life from the
Heavens), but he also went back to the medieval tradition.
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In Book III, Agrippa commits the physical and celestial worlds to the
protection of religion, which has the task of guaranteeing a rigorously non-
superstitious magic, immune to demonic deceptions. Religion provides the
magus with a model of moral improvement, allowing him to realize the
Hermetic ideal of the perfect philosopher, perfect magus, and perfect
“priest” (sacerdos). In describing the human path to Hermetic deification,
the first draft of Book III makes a clear distinction between faith and
science. Agrippa draws on Reuchlin to define the link between
illumination, offered by God to the human mind through faith, and reason,
which can gain true knowledge only by receiving it from the mind.
Reason, after attaining the innate contents of the mind, produces a science
which is legitimized by its divine origins and is therefore not susceptible
to the assault of doubts and errors. This was only an initial (and somewhat
vague) approach to a topic which would play an increasingly crucial role
in Agrippa’s thought. At this time, the primacy of faith, as expressed by
Reuchlin, functioned chiefly as the basis for a powerful and reliable
operative practice. As far as kabbalistic magic was concerned, Agrippa
seemingly played down Reuchlin’s raptures about the Hebrew language,
assimilating the sacred Hebrew names, instituted by God as the vehicles of
his power, to the so-called “strange” or “foreign words” (barbara verba)
of ancient theology and Neoplatonic theurgy.
The early version of De occulta philosophia was, in many respects, an
original attempt. Nevertheless, it did not perfectly succeed in organizing
Agrippa’s different and varying sources into a coherent structure—
especially as regards Book III, which played a pivotal role in connecting
magic to the religious foundation of learning. Not without reason, the
dedicatee Trithemius noticed these limitations, urging his pupil “not to
imitate bullocks, but to emulate birds” (Epistolae, pp. 503-04)—that is, to
turn his mind to the metaphysical Unity as a prior requirement for all
magic activity.
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3. De triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum
The key to understanding the internal coherence of Agrippa’s thought is to
be found in his deepening interest in Neoplatonic and Hermetic writings,
which allowed him to define the relationship between faith and reason in a
more comprehensive perspective. In the Plotinian (and Ficinian) theory of
the tripartite division of psychological faculties (mens, ratio, idolum),
mind (mens) represents the highest function, the head (caput) of the soul,
the divine spark present in every human being; when God creates each
soul, it is into this supreme portion that he infuses the innate ideas, which
mind directly intuits in God. Reason (ratio) is an intermediate function
between the mind, which continually communicates with God, and the
lower powers (idolum, that is, the sensory faculties), which are connected
to the material world. Reason, the seat of the will, is free to conform to
either of the contrasting directions indicated to it by the other parts of the
soul.
This more structured view was already capitalized in the short treatise De
triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum (On the Threefold Way of Knowing
God), dedicated to William Paleologus in 1516, but published only in
1529, in a version somewhat expanded by Agrippa before printing. The
term ratio had many meanings for Agrippa. Firstly, it recounted the ‘way’
of divine revelation. To manifest himself to mankind, God wrote three
books, by which the three different religious cultures were able to know
him. Ancient philosophers, reading the book of nature, knew God through
the created world; Hebrew theologians, reading the book of the law, knew
God through the angels and the prophets; Christians, reading the book of
the Gospel, gained perfect knowledge of God through his son, made man.
Secondly, ratio referred to the three “steps” (gradus) in the spiritual ascent
of every human soul to God: sense perception, rational knowledge, and
spiritual knowledge. Finally, like the scholastics, Agrippa intended ratio as
the epistemological criterion by which philosophical schools performed
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their theological investigations and reached their understanding of God’s
essence.
Agrippa projected the history of the individual soul and of philosophy
back into the time preceding human history: Adam’s sin is the archetypal
figure of the moral choices and intellectual options of his descendants.
Adam willingly renounced true knowledge when he, trusting more in Eve
than in God, presumed that he could achieve a knowledge capable of
making him equal to God. Similarly, each of us renews the original sin
committed by Adam when our reason denies that it is created and proudly
proclaims an autonomy of its own, shattering its harmonious relationship
with God. Once the hierarchy of cognition has been destabilized, reason
strives to find its contents in the senses, which are fallacious and
deceptive, and builds up a science which is both dubious and vain: devoid
of foundation, inert, and morally pernicious. Original sin is also repeated
in the schools of contemporary theologians, who try to know God by the
wretched means of their rebellious reason. This is the science of those,
who live “in the realm of the flesh” (Romans 8:9)—the science of the
“sophists of God” (theosophistae): fatuous, arrogant, quarrelsome and
immoral, unable of transforming their notions into actions, that is, of
solving the crisis of which they are both authors and victims.
Contemporary culture, as the fruit of this rebellious reason (which is, after
all, Aristotelian and scholastic reason), is fated only to describe, to lightly
touch on the structure of reality, without being able to penetrate it.
Agrippa was not professing any form of anti-intellectualism, but he was
applying the Platonic (broadly speaking) model of the tripartite soul to the
Christian way of knowledge. In accordance with this pattern, if reason
respects its subordination to the mind, that is, to the message, which God
has implanted directly in the soul, it fulfils the role which has been
assigned to it in the project of creation, which is to know God by means of
the book of nature. On the other hand, since the book of nature is written
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by the hand of God, the fundamental goodness of the world is implied; and
it is also implied that human beings have the ability to read these pages
and are, indeed, obliged to do so. Reason is therefore perfectly literate and
legitimate when it comes to deciphering this bundle of communicative
signs. Nonetheless, the book of nature is a means through which God
helps us to return to our origin. Therefore, the reading should be done with
our eyes fixed more on the author of the book than on its contents: the
knowledge of physical reality is merely a way of retracing through
sensible objects the cosmic process of love, which is centered on the
eternal Good, “beginning, middle and end” of everything which exists.
Humanity’s greatness resides purely and simply in its capacity to grasp
God by contemplating his works, the created symbols which bear witness
to their creator. Moreover, when reason “silences” the sensory part of the
soul and turns itself inwards to its highest function, it becomes conscious
of the constant illumination of the mind by God. At that moment, reason
grasps essences by an intuitive act which is superior to the purely rational
one, insofar as it is a “contact of the essence with God”. This is not a
mystical experience. It is an intellectual experience, founded on some
intuitive philosophical certainties, which revelation proves true. Faith
(fides) does not provide new contents, but unveils the deep sense of the
existing contents of the reason, which is operating in harmony with the
mind. A truly Christian philosopher, however, cannot be satisfied with
having achieved individual knowledge. The commandment to love our
neighbor requires us to become “leaders of the blind” (Matthew 15:14), “a
corrector of the foolish” and “a teacher of the immature” (Romans 2:20).
Contemporary “bad shepherds” (pupils of “the school of Satan”, as the
only preserved manuscript of De triplici ratione called them) neglect their
spiritual responsibilities. Therefore, the “new” Christian philosopher has
to turn into theologian, teaching the path to general redemption to his
brothers in Christ. In addition, he has to take care of the social benefits
deriving from his knowledge. Agrippa slightly, but significantly, modified
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the most celebrated sentence of the Hermetic Asclepius: “A human,
Asclepius, is a great miracle!”) by stating: “A Christian human is a great
miracle!” (Magnum miraculum est homo Christianus!, p. 146).
The allegorical interpretation of the original sin which Agrippa borrowed
from Paulus Ricius’ Isagoge (Introduction) was repeated two years later in
his De originali peccato (On Original Sin), written in 1518, but published
in 1529. Adam is faith, the foundation of reason. The Tree of Life, that is,
the privilege of knowing and contemplating God, was reserved to him.
Eve is reason, which was allowed to have a relationship with the snake,
that is, with material things and the senses. Unlike Adam, she was not
forbidden to eat from the Tree of Knowledge, that is, to know the physical
world. Our ancestors were equally responsible for original sin, but in
different ways: Eve/reason, because she placed trust and hope in the
senses and weakened faith’s firmness with her arguments; Adam/faith,
because he, wishing to indulge his woman, turned away from God to the
sensory world, relying entirely on the conclusions which reason drew from
senses. Agrippa did not generally censure the potential of reason, but
emphasized the hierarchical link between faith and reason. We are not
allowed to debate de divinis (“about divine matters”), in which we must
only have faith and hope. Instead, we can speculate about created beings,
but not have faith and hope in them.
The allegory was also invoked in his famous eulogy of women, De
nobilitate et praecellentia foeminei sexus (On the Nobility and Superiority
of the Feminine Sex), by which Agrippa hoped to ingratiate himself with
Margaret of Austria. Among all the topics which he meticulously collected
from the rich repository of this literary genre, he also proposed a more
philosophical argument in favor of women, analyzing Eve’s role in
original sin. It was Adam, who introduced spiritual death into the world,
since Eve was not prohibited from eating the fruit of the Tree of
Knowledge: thus, she was not guilty of disobeying God. Agrippa did not
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claim that Eve was completely without sin. More modestly, he maintained
that her sin did not entail transgressing God’s commandment; she sinned
nevertheless because she allowed the snake to tempt her and became the
occasion of Adam’s sin. She was deceived and went astray—not
“involuntarily” (Van der Poel 1997: 210), but “ignorantly”. What should
we understand by “ignorantly”? Agrippa could not seriously regard Eve’s
ignorance as a defect in her spiritual progress (as Augustine did in his The
Literal Meaning of Genesis) or as a weakness of her spiritual faculties (as
Isotta Nogarola did in her Dialogue on Adam and Eve). In the opening of
the treatise, Agrippa, recalling humankind’s creation (Genesis 1:26–7),
underlined that both Adam and Eve had been created in God’s image and
likeness: as rational souls, both shared the same psychological faculties,
the same teleology, and the same moral freedom. The seeming
inconsistency can be resolved by interpreting the biblical progenitors as
“figures” of Neoplatonic psychology. Reason’s ignorantia Dei (“ignorance
of God”) is not a passive “not-knowing” (which is, in any case,
unthinkable, because God is not concealed in unfathomable transcendence,
but “shines everywhere” in nature, and, above all, inside humans). On the
contrary, reason’s ignorantia Dei is an active “neglecting”, a will to turn
away from God and a pride in being an end in itself.
4. De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum
It is not possible to establish the extent to which the declamatio invectiva
which Agrippa announced to his friend Jean Chapelain in September 1526
was really finished at that time. We do know, however, that when Johannes
Grapheus published it in 1530, some parts at least had been expanded and
reworked, according to Agrippa’s custom (Nauert 1965: 108, n. 11;
Zambelli 1992: 81, n. 40). The work was reprinted many times and was
also translated into German (1534), Italian (1543), English (1569), French
(1582), and Dutch (1651).
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Richard Popkin underlined that Agrippa’s declamation does not contain
the “serious epistemological analysis” one would expect from a skeptical
debate and suggested that it should be considered as an expression of anti-
intellectualism and biblical fundamentalism (Popkin 2003: 29). This
reading, however, leaves the key question unresolved: such an anti-
intellectualism or biblical fundamentalism is difficult to reconcile with
Agrippa’s long-standing interest in precisely those sciences which by then
should have been swept away by the appeal to verbum Dei (“word of
God”). It is undeniably true that in De vanitate the moral angle prevails
over the epistemological critique. This is because Agrippa also looked at
trades, professions, pastimes, and social types, none of which were
susceptible to epistemological analysis. Moreover, when discussing a
science, he was primarily interested in focusing on how it was used and on
its concrete effects on society, rather than in investigating its methods and
subjects. Some scholars have identified De vanitate as the result of a
profound personal crisis (psychological, religious, or cultural), which led
Agrippa to a radical criticism of the system of occult doctrines and of his
own intellectual choices. No doubt, the circumstances of his life between
1526 and 1530 influenced the tone of the work which he was preparing,
accentuating its harshness and inspiring some of its more polemical and
audacious pages. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that, all of the sudden,
Agrippa abandoned his philosophical convictions, solely because of
indignation at the treatment he suffered at the court of Louise of Savoy
(Weeks 1993: 120–24). Likewise, the hypothesis of an intellectual
upheaval (Keefer 1988: 614–53; Zambelli 2000: 41) remains merely
conjectural. Agrippa’s supposed disbelief in science (and, above all, in
astrology and magic) contrasts with his continuing work on De occulta
philosophia and with his project for a reform of the magical tradition,
based on a new vision of science. It is important to recognize that there
were serious motivations behind his fierce attack on the foundations of
knowledge. Bowen (1972: 249–56) and Korkowski (1976: 594–607),
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reducing De vanitate to a simple exercise of rhetoric in the fashionable
literary genre of the paradox, correctly outlined the work’s formal
characteristics; however, they did not sufficiently take into account its
philosophical intentions and turned its subversive implications into
something quite inoffensive. De vanitate proposed a reform project, one
which was broader, more complex, and more radical than that of its model,
Erasmus’ Praise of Folly (Laus stultitiae).
Agrippa’s aim was to pass judgment on the condition, methods, and
practitioners of the philosophical and theological schools which dominated
his time. His verdict is undoubtedly very severe. He believed that
contemporary culture, lost in useless sophisms, was no longer able to
fulfill its task of educating Christian people and promoting their spiritual
well-being. The social fabric had become torn by corruption, by political
and religious struggles, and by heresies and superstitions. He did not,
however, intend De vanitate to be merely destructive. His aim was also to
propose a cultural alternative, delineating a different philosophical
approach, capable of forming a new intellectual élite, who would be
seriously interested in the moral and religious progress of human
community.
Certainly, the most striking aspect of the declamatio is its critical stance.
The all-encompassing polemical parade emphasizes that human
“inventions” (inventiones)—grammar as well as dance, theology as well as
hunting, ethics as well as dice games—are nothing more than opinions,
devoid of coherence and stability, and irreparably harmful to support the
spiritual health of believers. The discord which divides practitioners of
each branch of science attests to the intrinsic weakness of the findings of
natural reason, which proceeds by conjectures, subject to refutation.
Everything reason devises and carries out, relying on its own strength
alone, is fallacious, useless, and damaging: “the structure of the sciences is
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so risky and unstable that it is much safer not to know anything than to
have knowledge” (1, p. 5). The happiest life is the life of the ignorant.
The usual compilation of discordant opinions of philosophers was partly
shaped by texts of the ancient skeptics; but for the most part Agrippa made
use of more recent sources: Ficino, Reuchlin, and Francesco Giorgio
Veneto. There are no quotations from Gianfrancesco Pico’s Examen
vanitatis doctrinae gentium, the first detailed reading of the work of
Sextus Empiricus (Schmitt 1967: 237–42). This significant omission
suggests that Agrippa did not agree with the skeptical fideism expressed
by Gianfrancesco. De vanitate did not, in fact, question the human ability
to know causes. Rather, it questioned the capacity of Aristotelian
epistemology to account for the nature of things. In chapter 7, Agrippa
states that knowledge based on sense perception is not able to guarantee a
sure and truthful experience, since the senses are fallible; nor does it
succeed in revealing the causes and properties of phenomena or in
knowing what is only intelligible, since this escapes the grasp of the
senses. Not all human knowledge was open to question, however. Instead,
Agrippa, by proving that a sense-based theory of knowledge cannot
produce science, intended to introduce another epistemology, one which
he regarded as the foundation for true knowledge. So, in chapter 52, “On
the Soul”, he did not uphold even the façade of skepticism. “Demonic
Aristotle” (daemoniacus Aristoteles) made the soul dependent on the
nature of the body, defining it as “the first perfection of a natural body
possessing organs, which potentially has life” (Aristotle, De anima II.1).
“Divine Plato” (divinus ille Plato) aligned himself with those philosophers
(Zoroaster, Hermes, and Orpheus) who had defined the soul as a divine
substance: the “product of an incorporeal maker” and dependent “solely
on the power of its efficient cause, not on the bowels of matter” (52, pp.
109-10). Agrippa noted the disagreement between Aristotle and Plato on
this subject, not in order to lead his readers to a skeptical “suspension of
judgment” (epoché). Rather, he intentionally contrasted two different
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models of rationality, explicitly weighing up their value. At least on this
matter, the “ancient theology” (prisca theologia) and the Platonic school
were found to be consistent with the criterion of truth, the Holy Scriptures.
The real intentions of De vanitate have to be extracted from deep inside
the text, hidden beneath more polemical and provocative statements. The
sciences of their own accord “do not procure for us any divine felicity
which transcends the capacity of man, except perhaps that felicity which
the serpent promised to our ancestors”; but in itself “every science is both
bad and good” and deserves whatever praise “it can derive from the
probity of its possessor” (1, p. 21). Agrippa appropriated here the
Aristotelian principle of the ethical neutrality of science: it is the spiritual
attitude of the knower, his “integrity” (probitas), which constitutes the
moral criterion of the discipline and ensures good or bad usage. From the
cultural point of view, the destructive action of skepticism puts an end to
the discussion between the schools by eliminating one of the two
contenders, that is, all philosophers whose doctrines are built on the
foundation of sensory experience. From the pedagogical point of view,
however, skepticism is no more than a preliminary training. Systematic
debate about sensory representations and the suspension of judgment
concerning the appearances of the material world free the soul from false
opinions, demonstrating the inadequacy of empiricism and directing the
search for truth towards the intelligible.
Purification leads to a new spiritual attitude, which makes the philosopher
capable of undertaking the route to true knowledge. Truth, in fact, is
grasped only by turning inwards, to the mind, where God implanted the
innate ideas when he created the soul. Agrippa’s acceptance of the
Neoplatonic theory of knowledge is positively expressed in the final
peroration of De vanitate, when he invites his readers to abandon the
schools of the sophists in order to regain awareness of the cognitive
inheritance to which every soul has an original entitlement. Agrippa refers
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to the Academics alongside Holy Scripture to support the idea that human
beings have an innate realm of knowledge, which needs to be recovered
by means of a suitable paideia, or program of education. The return to
original perfection is an ‘illumination’—not a mystical illumination, but
an intellectual one: the reminiscence and re-appropriation of self-
knowledge. Ultimately, illumination is the knowledge of the self as
“mind” (mens) or “intellect” (intellectus).
In this sense, Agrippa defines faith as the “foundation of reason”
(fundamentum rationis), that is, the criterion, guarantee, and firm basis of
human knowledge. Revelation is without doubt the absolute and complete
expression of truth; but it originates from the same source as the contents
of the mind, on which the activity of reason is dependent. Since God is the
sole source of truth, the tradition of faith is homogeneous with
philosophical contemplation, which finds its justification in revelation.
Through divine will, rationality and its higher level of “spiritual
intelligence” are able to establish a relationship of continuity. For this
reason, rational science and all its practical applications gain authenticity
and legitimacy if they develop within a theological framework. This does
not mean that reason has to draw its contents directly from Scripture.
Rather, it means that the contents of science, procured by the exercise of
reason, are “true” when they do not contradict divine design, do not hinder
the spiritual progress of the Christian, and contribute to the good of
humanity and the world. Certainly, the architect will not seek technical
instructions for how to put up his building in the Bible. Instead, he and
those who commission him need to seek in it an indication of the
“manner” (modus) and “end” (finis) of this discipline. Architecture would
be an art and science “extraordinarily necessary and beautiful” in itself
and capable of making a large contribution to the well-being of the civil
community, if humankind had not rendered it vain and noxious by their
excessive use of it “for the simple exhibition of the riches” and by
heedlessly destroying the natural surroundings.
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In De vanitate, Agrippa does not put faith in opposition to science or the
Holy Scriptures in opposition to human books. He instead puts
Aristotelian philosophy, worldly science and the source of unbelief in
opposition to “Platonic” philosophy, the model of a Christian “science in
the word of God” (scientia in verbo Dei). With this expression, Agrippa
refers to a religiously orientated science: a science which can move freely
in the sphere of the “visible manifestations of God” (visibilia Dei) in order
to know his “invisible essentials” (invisibilia) and to trace the beginning
and origin of everything. He does this in the awareness of the harmony
between faith and reason, which scholastic Aristotelian philosophy had
disowned, infecting the world with a plague of “petty syllogisms”
(ratiunculae), sophisms, and impertinent questions about God. There is, in
sum, a ‘divine’ path to knowledge, which Plato and the ancient
theologians founded on God and which deals with God. And there is a
“demonic” path, which Aristotle constituted merely on human abilities and
which deals with lower things: it is demonic, because it renews and
perpetuates the sin of Adam, inspired by Satan and his proud ambition to
make himself equal to the creator in the knowledge of good and evil.
Agrippa’s distinction between different forms of rationality—valued
differently according to their basis and their final point of view—allows us
to regard his declamatio invectiva as not belonging to a true and proper
profession of skepticism, of general anti-intellectualism, or of rigorous
fideism. Instead, it can be realigned with the anti-Aristotelian and anti-
scholastic critiques of Ficino, Reuchlin, and Giorgio. Agrippa did not
propose abandonment in God in the undifferentiated indifference of
“neither this one nor that one” advocated by Sextus Empiricus. In his
view, skepticism constituted an exercise in education, necessary for
pointing the way towards the apprehension of truth. In the final digression,
“In Praise of the Ass”, Agrippa seemingly invites his readers to put down
the baggage of the human sciences and return to being “naked and simple
asses”, and thus newly capable of carrying on their own backs the
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mysteries of divine wisdom, like the ass which carried Jesus into
Jerusalem. This ironic exhortation is polemical: those who must be
subjected to metamorphosis into an ass are the “noble doctors in sciences”,
professing a purely human (or rather, demonic) science. For scholastic
theologians, the motto “To know nothing is the happiest life” (nihil scire
foelicissima vita) is valid, since “there is nothing more fatal than a science
stuffed with impiety” (1, p. 4). Philosophy should be a religious progress
—or, rather, a regressus, a return to the source of being.
5. De occulta philosophia (final draft)
In De vanitate, Agrippa did not make any explicit recantation of his
passion for occult sciences (Keefer 1988: 618); he simply admitted that
there might have been something wrong in his juvenile work on magic,
because of his adolescent curiosity. In fact, the renewal of magic
continued to be a central feature of his intellectual journey. Between 1530
and 1533, right in the middle of his violent battle against theologians and
conservatives, he was preparing De occulta philosophia for publication,
entrusting his last hope of a secure financial support to the same work to
which he had committed his desire for fame and fortune twenty years
earlier. Although in the meantime his religious concerns had deepened, he
did not perceive any conflict between his involvement in theological
debates and his persistent interest in the task of rebuilding magic. In his
mind, they were two coherent aspects of a single project, as he had already
pointed out in De triplici ratione cognoscendi Deum. There Agrippa had
made clear that reforming culture on the basis of the solid certainty of
God’s illumination also implied regaining humankind’s original perfection
and thaumaturgic ability, which Adam owned by right before he sinned.
Comparison of the 1510 dedication copy, sent by Agrippa to Trithemius
(MS Würzburg, M.ch.q.50), with the printed final edition (Cologne 1533),
reveals the careful and thorough revision and enlargement to which the
Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim
24 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
first draft was subjected. The book doubled in length, and fresh ideas and
references were included. In updating the text, Agrippa mostly drew on
works consistent with the sources he had already used in drafting the
initial version. Between 1510 and 1533, he had studied a number of texts
which he had previously been unaware of or neglected (Ficino’s
commentaries on Plato and on Plotinus; Giovanni Pico’s Conclusiones,
Heptaplus, and Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem;
Lodovico Lazzarelli’s Crater Hermetis; and Gianfrancesco Pico’s De
rerum praenotione) or which had been published in the meantime (some
of Erasmus’ writings; Paulus Ricius’ commentaries on Hebrew writings;
Reuchlin’s De arte cabalistica; and Francesco Giorgio’s De harmonia
mundi). Agrippa’s vast exploration of books allowed him to re-orient his
youthful project, providing a definitive justification of his aim to restore in
full the religious, cognitive, and practical scope of ancient magic. This
“reformed magic” (magia reformata) would not only guarantee to the
magus mastery over nature and the ability to attract astral and angelic
virtues, but would also assure his ascent to the First Principle.
The revised version of De occulta philosophia offers extensive proof of
this significant qualitative shift. The original tripartite structure was given
a new metaphysical structure, which powerfully underlined the idea of the
cosmos as an epiphany of the divine. Thanks to the influence of Giorgio’s
De harmonia mundi, Agrippa was able to adopt a radically new approach
to natural magic. Now, Book I explicitly contemplates the material world
as the receptacle of divine and presents the occult virtues as an example of
the living links connecting the terrestrial forms to the First Cause through
the chain of the higher intermediaries (stars and spiritual essences). The
“perfection of both science and practice” is guaranteed by the ability to
change the impure back to the pure, and plurality back to simplicity. In
significant additions “on the properties of elements” (chapters 3–6),
William Newman (1982) recognized the description of the alchemical
reduction of elemental earth to the purity of first matter. There are three
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orders of elements, corresponding to the three levels of being: pure
elements, unmixed and incorruptible; compound elements, multiplex,
varied and impure, but which can be reduced to “pure simplicity” (pura
simplicitas); lastly, decomposed elements, convertible into one another.
Earth, which confers solidity on other elements, mixing with them but
without changing into them, is the receptacle of every celestial influence,
because it is continuously animated by the virtues conveyed by the
spiritus: so, earth is “the foundation and mother of everything”, because it
encloses the seminal virtues of all creation. Therefore, having undergone
the process of purification and simplification, it becomes “the purest
remedy for restoring and preserving us”. The process of universal
simplification of the elements can be carried out by reducing earth to the
original purity of the first matter. Newman explained the nature of this
process, referring to chapter 4 of Book II, on the power of the number one.
Here, Agrippa traces the presence of unity in all levels of existence: God
in the archetypal world, the anima mundi in the intellectual one, the Sun in
the heavenly world, the heart in man, and Lucifer in hell. In the elemental
world, the one is the philosopher’s stone, “embodying all wonders”,
without which “neither alchemy, nor natural magic may attain their perfect
end”. Agrippa’s source, as Newman has pointed out, was a letter in which
Trithemius gave a cosmological interpretation of the Hermetic text
“Emerald Tablet” (Tabula Smaragdina), identifying the alchemical opus as
the universal “path to the highest unity” (Epistolae, pp. 471-73).
Book II introduces a massive quantity of “technical” references, in some
part influenced by the corpus of magical manuscripts which had belonged
to Trithemius and which came into Agrippa’s possession in 1520. This
updating, however, depended for the most part on epistolary exchanges of
texts and ideas with his correspondents. Despite his violent attack on the
divinatory arts in De vanitate, he presented here a more comprehensive
treatment of astrology. After all, magic (although “reformed”) could not
dispense with astrology. Occult virtues can be explained only in terms of
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the heavenly qualities conveyed by the rays which emanate from stars. It
is each individual’s horoscope which determines his or her specific
powers. Even the relationships of “attraction or repulsion” (amicitia vel
lis) between sublunary bodies correspond to the relationships between
celestial bodies. Agrippa insistently emphasizes the link connecting magic
to astrology, defining the latter as “the much-needed key for all secrets”. In
recognizing the pivotal role played by astrology, Agrippa seems to
contradict his harsh judgment of this science in De vanitate: fallacious
conjecture, practiced by superstitious, ignorant, and mendacious followers.
The contradiction is only apparent, however. Like any other human
science, astrology is both bad and good. It is bad in the hands of those who
pass off a conjecture as an infallible fact, thus denying man’s freedom and
the divine providential design. It is good in the hands of the Christian
magus, who uses it to reveal that God shines everywhere and to benefit his
own kind. In the context of Agrippa’s purpose in De occulta philosophia,
good (that is, non-deterministic) astrology remains the key to rebuilding
true Christian magic.
Book III was most affected by Agrippa’s meticulous recasting of the
treatise. Through his contact with Latin kabbalistic texts (both, translations
from Hebrew literature as well as works by Christian followers), Agrippa
was able to insert many new chapters: on the Sephiroth, that is, the ten
attributes or emanations surrounding the infinite; on the ten names of God;
and on angels and demons. His (second-hand) openness to the Hebrew
tradition inspired a more mature approach to a number of essential issues.
In particular, the topic that humanity is created “in the image of God”
became a more developed account of the human being as a “small world”
(microcosmus). Juxtaposing the original nucleus, drawn from his own
unfinished Dialogus de homine (Dialogue on Humankind), with selected
passages from the doctrine of the Zohar, the most important kabbalistic
work (via Giorgio’s De harmonia mundi), Agrippa was able to elaborate
further his cherished doctrine of three parts of human soul. Since soul’s
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three parts (neshama, ruah, and nephesch in Hebrew) have different
origins and natures, they also have different destinies. After the body’s
death, the sensitive soul (nephesch, idolum) immediately dissolves. Mind
(neshama), as the breath of God, is immune from sin and returns
immediately to its abode, reuniting with its origin. Reason (ruah), by
contrast, must undergo judgment with regard to the choices it has made in
life: it will participate in the beatific vision if it has followed the way of
the mind; it will be damned and reduced to the status of an evil demon if it
has made itself a slave of the sensitive soul. In this way, the topic of
humankind as created in the image of God assumed a more defined
eschatological meaning. In Agrippa’s view, the Pauline “You are the
temple of God” (I Corinthians 3:16) meant recognizing the presence of
God in each human being—the mind, which characterizes the peculiar
dignity of the microcosmus in conformity with humankind’s privilege of
being made in the image of God. Interiority became the foundation of the
intellectual and religious life. The cultural background of the magus must
be wide-ranging, but his claim to perfection is to be founded on his self-
consciousness.
The path to attaining wisdom requires moral and intellectual training
(dignificatio). Firstly, “natural” perfection (dignitas) is needed, that is, the
perfect physical and mental disposition granted by a favorable horoscope
(the same which Jesus Christ had). Avicenna’s doctrine of the “perfect
human being” (homo perfectus), the prophet, is recognizable here.
According to Agrippa, however, those who were not born under this
favorable constellation can replace the natural dignitas which they lack
with an “artificial” one, using selected foodstuffs, natural remedies, and a
proper lifestyle. The second requirement is the “merit” (dignitas
meritoria), that is, the overcoming of corporeal passions and sensitive
impressions, the recovery of knowledge, and the mastery of everything:
when reason subjects itself to mind, man’s soul becomes a “soul standing
and not falling” (anima stans et non cadens) and is able to perform
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miracles “by God’s virtue” (in virtute Dei). The third requirement is
“godliness” (ars religiosa), that is, the constant and pious practicing of
sacred ceremonies, which are metaphors and perceptible signs of the
transformation worked by God in us. This does not mean the requirement
to carry out initiatory rituals in order to gain access to esoteric and supra-
rational mysteries. Agrippa’s appeal to spiritual purification was essential
precisely because his book made known to everyone the ‘secrets’ of
magic. Only a person who is “perfectly pious and truly religious”,
however, can legitimately perform ‘true’ and ‘pure’ magic. This is why
spiritual rebirth (and, hence, magic) is not available to everyone: the
divine spark which is naturally present in each individual is completely
inactive in the majority of humankind, whose reason is overwhelmed by
the impulses of their senses.
Agrippa’s overall oeuvre may be regarded as an uninterrupted meditation
on humanity: the meaning of its existence, its possibility of gaining not
only eternal bliss, but also happiness on earth. From this point of view,
Agrippa may be considered as a “humanist theologian” (Van der Poel
1997). Nonetheless, he proposed a radical revision of the very idea of
theology. It should not be a “subalternating” or higher “science”, placed at
the end of a long and complex training, as medieval scholastics had done.
Instead, theology must be an isagogic, or introductory, knowledge, since
its task was to guide Christian people in their moral improvement, as well
as in their earthly well-being. Agrippa’s theology, more than a
philosophical treatment of God, was, above all, a serious reflection on
humankind, with the goal of leading it to self-consciousness and, then,
making it fully aware of its origin and its final end. Ultimately, Agrippa
may be better defined as a “civic theologian”. The specific intentions of
his works, their literary genres, and the personal background to their
composition are all very different, which to some extent may explain
certain inconsistencies between them. Nevertheless, despite every
apparent contradiction and ambiguity presented by an impetuous,
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polemical, and very often foolhardy personality such as Agrippa, he
always assessed human knowledge (including magic) with respect to its
awareness of the relationship which binds man to God. The way to truth
lies not in the rifts between different schools of thought or in philosophical
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